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THEORIES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
IN MODERN PROPERTY LAW
Sukhninder Panesar**
INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that justificatory theories of private property, certainly
in the western philosophical tradition, divide roughly into two. This is no better
summarized than by Getzler who writes:
"[t]here is a notion of property as presocial, a natural right
expressing the rights of persons which are prior to the state and
law, this being the view of Hugo Grotius, Samual von Pufendorf,
John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and George W.F. Hegel; and there
is a notion of property as social, a positive right created
instrumentally by community, state, or law to secure other goals-
the theory of Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Adam Smith,
Jeremy Bentham, Emile Durkenheim, and Max Weber."
1
The philosophical analysis of property is an ever-continuing process since the
meaning, function and existence of the institution of private property is not
constant but dynamic.
The institution of private property is influenced by a number of factors, not
least by the way in which the dominant classes in society expect the institution
of private property to serve. In the same way as the dominant classes of society
change, so does the institution of private property.2 For example, Aristotle,
. This article is based on a chapter from a forthcoming book written by the author, Concepts
in Property Law to be published by Longmans.
School of International Studies and Law, Coventry University.
J.Getzler, "Theories of Property and Economic Development" Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, XXVI: 4 (1996) at p.641. See also, Waldron, The Right to Private Property
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988); S.Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge University
Press, 1990), and more recently, M.J.Radin, Reinterpreting Property (University of Chicago
Press, 1993).
2 For a critical review of the recent and continued philosophical analysis of property see
L.Becker, "Too Much Property" Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXI (1992) 196-206.
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questioning the proper system of property in an ideal constitution, argues for a
regime of private property as the best means of attaining net productivity in the
utilization of land.3 Aristotle argues:
"when everyone has his own separate sphere of interest, there
will not be the same ground for quarrels; and the amount of
interest will increase, because each man will feel he is applying
himself to what is his own.,A
This line of argument has more recently been advanced by Demsetz who that
writes the "primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to
achieve a greater internalization of externalities." 5 However, philosophers such
as Plato6 argued for a regime of communal property as opposed to private, and
more recently, Marx commenting on the evils of private property argued for the
abolition of private property and the transfer of the ownership of the means of
production to the state.
This article explores four dominant justificatory theories of private property
with two main objectives in mind. In the first place, the article attempts to show
that such justificatory theories and commentary thereupon usually encapsulate
three separate questions. The first is the basic question: "What principles decide
which individuals have ownership rights over what things?" 8 This question is
different from the second question which seeks to ask what are the social or
public functions of private ownership? The third question, closely related to the
second, simply asks: "What individual interests are served by the existence of
private property as opposed to some other property regime (such as
communism)?" 9 Thus, in dealing with justificatory theories for private property,
it becomes apparent that theorists either attempt to justify private property by
simply looking at the acts of an individual in respect of external resources or
they attempt to look at the more broader question of the goals achieved by the
existence of private property. The latter does not necessarily entertain questions
as to how people become owners of things but merely seeks to provide a
plausible explanation for the existence of private property.
3 Aristotle, The Politics, (translated by E.Baker, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946).
4 Ibid at p.49,
5 H.Demsetz, "Towards a Theory of Property Rights" American Economic Review:
Proceedings andPapers, 57 at p.348 (1967).
6 Plato, The Republic (translated by Desmond Lee, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974).
7 K.Marx, The Communist Manifesto (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1976).
8 R. Epstein, "Possession as The Root of Title" 13 Georgia Law Review at p. 122 0 (1979).
' J.Waldron, supra. n. 1 at p. 1.
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The second objective of the article is to explore the extent to which these
justificatory theories continue to be reflected in modem property law. In other
words, are these justificatory theories influential in the judicial law-making
process and do they provide a plausible explanation for the existence of private
property rights in contemporary property law. In this respect one commentator
writes:
"[t]here is a solid consensus among philosophers and legal and
political theorists that attempted original acquisitions of private
property, when presented in any even remotely plausible form, in
fact have little or no interesting force. However compelling their
intuitive underpinnings might be, they can justify nothing which
helps much in our deliberation about the possible moral defenses
of private property in contemporary society.'
0
The article attempts to show that, both original acquisition theories of private
property, and those theories of private property which examine the broader
question of the goals secured by a regime of private property rights, continue to
be reflected in modem property law.
OCCUPATION THEORY
One of the earliest justifications for private property is contained in what has
been called the occupation theory. This theory attempts to answer the relatively
simple question of how things become the subject matter of private ownership.
We take it for granted that things are ours because we have acquired them from
another person who has ownership to pass on to us. Such acquisitions can occur
through a voluntary transfer such as a gift or a bequest in a will or; simply by a
purchase for value. Thus, the law prescribes methods by which ownership can
be acquired from another, for example, a transfer by deed or mere delivery of
the thing in question. The law does not, however, tell us how that chain of
ownership began, in other words, why was ownership of the thing recognized in
the first place?
Early philosophers such as Hugo Grotius 11 and Pufendorf' 2 argued that the
earth's resources were given to mankind in common. Likewise, Blackstone
wrote:
'0 A.J.Simmons, "Original Acquisition Justifications of Private Property" in Property Rights,
Paul, Miller and Paul (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 1994) at p.65.
11 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War andPeace, Book 2. Ch.2, 1, 4-5 (Kelsey translation,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1925).
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"[t]he earth.. and all things therein, are the general property of
mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of
the Creator... all was in common among them, and that every one
took from the public stock to his own use such things as his
immediate necessities required.
1 3
In this sense of communal property, private property was born out of individual
taking which, Blackstone commented, was for his or her own need. If
individuals will claim the material things of the earth, thus effecting demand,
such philosophers argued that the resulting scarcity value would naturally
require a system of allocation in order to preserve peace and order. Without
such a system there would be constant disputes as to what belonged to one
person and what to another. The system which gave rise to the institution of
private property was first occupation, hence, the occupation theory or
justification for private property.
The essence behind the occupation theory is that, given that all material
resources are given to mankind in common, such material resources become the
private property of individuals through the consent of or agreement with the rest
of mankind. The division of property takes place by reference to agreements.
Such agreements can be express, that is, a clear acceptance by a group of
individuals that material resources, for example land or animals, will be
distributed amongst themselves on a mutual understanding. In the absence of
such express agreements, an implied agreement could be found on the simple
basis of first occupation. The basic principle emerging here is the first
occupation gives rise to private property, put into the words of the common law,
possession is the root of title.14
If the occupation theory holds that an implied agreement will be found
amongst individuals that a thing has become the private property of another
through occupation, when does first occupation take place? Despite the apparent
simplicity of the theory, the question of who has taken first possession is much
more difficult when applied to factual situations. The central problem relates to
the actual point at which and the amount of labour needed to take first
possession. The problem is particularly acute when there are overlapping efforts
12 Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, J. Churchill etal. (eds.) (1703).
13 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. II. para 1 (4 vols.,
Oxford University Press, 1765-9; rep. University of Chicago Press, 1979).
14 See for example; Asher v. Whitlock [1865] 1 QB. 1; Perry v. Chssold [1907] A.C. 73;
Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed., 1984) at pp. 105-
106; Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Common Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888).
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to take first possession. The seminal case which attempts to answer these
question is Pierson v. Post, a classic wild animal case from the early 19th
century. 15 The case involved an action of trespass by Post against Pierson on the
grounds that Pierson had interfered with Post's property in a wild fox. The facts
of the case are relatively simple, Post in possession of certain dogs was hunting
on an abandoned beach, having caught sight of a wild fox, he led pursuit for it
and had the fox in his gunsight. Before Post had any chance of killing the fox,
Pierson intercepted his pursuit and killed the fox and took away the carcass.
Pierson's interception took place with the full knowledge that Post was in hot
pursuit of the animal. The basis of Post's action was that his pursuit had given
him property in the fox that had now been interfered with by Pierson.
The judgments in the case are very interesting and attempt to lay down some
general principles as to when first occupation or possession occurs. Justice
Tompkins delivered the decision of the majority, who held in favour of Pierson.
After citing a long list of authorities both English and American, and consulting
the opinion of jurists, the majority held that actual capture and control of the
thing in question could give rise to first possession. The hot pursuit of Post was
insufficient to give him any property in the fox. Furthermore, it mattered not
that Post could have killed the fox had it not have been for Pierson's
interception. For the majority, possession meant a clear act whereby the entire
world understands that the pursuer has "an unequivocal intention of
appropriating the animal to his individual use."' 6 Anything short of such an act
would be insufficient to give property in the animal. There are sound
justifications in this position in that, in the absence of a kill and complete
control of the animal, when does the court assign possession? The underlying
objective of the majority ruling was to avoid constant disputes and quarrels
about when possession takes place.
Justice Livingstone dissented on the grounds that the question of first
possession should not be decided by a judge but by a panel of hunters.' 7 In his
view the matter would have clearly been decided in favour of Post by such
hunters, the majority ruling had the effect of discouraging fox hunting.
Professor Rose as argued there appear to be two principles emanating from
the decision in Pierson v. Post as to when first occupation takes place. First,
notice to the whole world through a clear act, and secondly, the reward of useful
labour.' 8 These two principles require discussion because they seem at first
15 3 Caines. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1805).
A6 Ibid at 178.
A7 Ibid at 180.
18 See, C. Rose, "Possession as the Origin of Property" 52 The University of Chicago Law
Review at p. 7 8 (1985)
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instance to be rather contradictory. The former principle suggests that first
occupation takes place when there is a clear act to the whole world that control
has been taken by the possessor. The second principle, however, suggests that
first occupation takes place by mixing one's labour, for example, by hunting the
thing in question. The second principle on its own leaves a number of
difficulties. First, it leaves a number of question unanswered in the decision in
Pierson v. Post, and secondly, it fails to explain the difference, if any, between
the occupation theory and the rather different labour theory of property which is
discussed later on. If the principle is to reward labour then what about the
labour employed by Post in his pursuit of the fox? On this second principle,
Post should have been entitled to the fox as his property. Despite these initially
apparent contradictions, the two principles work hand-in-hand. The central
principle is that of notice to the whole world through an unequivocal act to
appropriate. The question can be put in the following way; who has exercised a
better control?19 Labour is important only in so far as making that
communication effective. Thus the facts of Pierson v. Post can be explained by
stating that, although Post had employed some labour in hunting the fox, his
labour had never reached the important stage of communicating notice to the
whole world. Pierson's labour had the effect of making that important notice to
the whole world.
The rule emanating from the occupation theory of private property is that
objects become the private property of individuals when such individuals have
taken occupation of them. Occupation is only effective when there has been a
clear act of appropriation and which has been communicated to the whole
world. Pursuit and acts, which fall short of such an unequivocal act of
appropriation, are insufficient because of the problem of assigning possession
when there are two or more overlapping efforts to take occupation. The
principle behind the occupation theory is thus clear enough, however, it may be
questioned whether the theory has any contemporary significance in property
law. The primary objection to its continued reliance in contemporary property
law is that it is based on facts, which are both historical and primitive. 20 The
conditions operating at the time of writers such as Grotius and Pufendorf simply
do not exist in a complex system of resources which we witness today.
Resources are not as commonly held today as they were before, rather, they are
19 This question is employed by the courts in many of the English law cases relating to
finding and is also central to the question of whether someone has exercised an appropriate
adverse possession of land to thereby extinguish a former legal title.
20 The theory has been criticized by some as being a mere description of the origin of
property, see, for example; R.H.Lowie, "Incorporeal Property in Primitive Society" 37 Yale
Law ,Journal at p 551 (1928).
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more and more parceled into private property. This process having its origins in
the 17'h century as a result of the spread of the full capitalist market economy in
western political systems.
It is submitted that, despite the historical and primitive conditions operating in
the occupation theory, the theory remains an important one in present day
property law. There are several reasons why the theory is important. In the first
place, it cannot be denied that the theory provides the most basic justification
for private property. It tells us why private ownership came about in the first
place. Many theories on private property attempt to justify the institution of
private property, yet they do so not by reference to how such property came
about, but rather by looking at the social and economic functions of private
ownership. Such theories fail to explain how the chain of ownership began in
the first place, instead taking it for granted that the legal system has a concept of
private property. In this respect, Epstein writes:
"[iut could be decided that ownership is necessary to create
effective incentives for the development and improvement of
property or to reduce or eliminate conflicts between private
persons. Yet even if these points are true, such broad
justifications for ownership do not solve the more particular
question of how given bits of property are matched with given
individuals. '
2
'
Secondly, the principle line of thought developed in the occupation theory still
continues to be reflected in modem property law. It may well seem.that the
cases such as the capture of wild animals are more academic than real life legal
disputes in property law, however, analogous facts do appear in present day
property law. One commentator writes:
"these cases are not silly.. .people still do find treasure laden
vessels, and statesmen do have to consider whether someone's
act may support a claim to own the moon, for example, or the
mineral nodes at the bottom of the sea.,
22
More importantly, however, the principles operating in the occupation theory
are still used by the courts in resolving modem day property law disputes. The
rule of notice and communication finds itself applicable in the common law
cases governing the finding of abandoned and lost objects and also in the law of
2 R.Epstein, supra n.8 at p.1221.
22 C.Rose, supra. n. 18 at p.75.
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
adverse possession. The common law treats ownership as a relative concept,
where objects are lost or abandoned the law allows the finder to assert a full-
blooded ownership right against everyone except the original true owner. In
such cases of abandoned and lost objects the law has to prescribe conditions
under which the finder can assert an ownership right against others. Where
objects have been found in a communal or public area, the principle of first
occupation has been applied to assign ownership, Thus in one case, Parker v.
British Airways Board a passenger who found a gold bracelet in the executive
lounge of an airport was allowed to keep the proceeds of sale. 23 His finding had
given him an ownership right binding on the airport which had not made any
attempts to control or appropriate lost objects in a public part of the airport. The
passenger had, in the context of the occupation theory, made effective notice to
the whole world by picking the bracelet and taking control thereof. The airport
authority had made no attempt to control lost property by putting up an effective
sign to indicate that such lost objects belonged to the airport.
The degree of effort or labour needed to make the communication to the
whole world depends on the nature of the resource in question. In Pierson v.
Post the degree of effort needed to take control, and thus make communication
to the whole world, was to physically capture the wild fox. 24 However, some
resources are incapable of entire physical control, their first occupation is
judged be reference to their nature. For example, in The Tubantia the plaintiffs
had been doing some salvage work on a wreck which had sunk in 1916 in the
North sea.25 The plaintiffs, having spent some £40,000 on the salvage work,
managed to make an artificial hole in the side of the wreck and began the
process of recovering the contents of the wreck. In 1923 the defendants
appeared at the site of the wreck and began their own efforts to recover the
wreck and the cargo. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled
to the wreck and its cargo and that the defendants had interfered with their
possession of the wreck. In applying the very same principles enunciated in the
occupation theory, the court went on to hold that the plaintiffs were doing with
the wreck what an owner or purchaser would have done, their occupation was
sufficient to exclude the defendants from interfering with their wreck.
Similarly in the law and policy relating to the adverse possession of land, the
rule of notice and communication sufficient to give occupation is clearly a
central requirement. The principle of adverse possession recognizes that long
uncontested possession of land by a trespasser confers upon such a person an
effective title to the land. Leading land law commentators attribute this process
23 [1982] Q.B. 1004.
24 Supra n. 15.
25 [1924] All E.R. Rep. 615.
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to the self-defining quality of property in land as an empirical fact rather than a
question of form based on some abstract theories of ownership. Two such
commentators writes:
"[o]n this view property in land is more about fact than about
right; it derives ultimately not from words upon parchment but
from the elementary primacy of sustained possession.26
At first instance, disputes relating to the adverse possession of land do not
concern questions of first occupation of land. However, the cumulative effect of
the Limitation Act 198027 and long undisturbed possession by the trespasser do
not move the facts too far away from the factual situation of first occupation. In
such cases of adverse possession the common law requires the trespasser to
have asserted a "complete and exclusive physical control" 8 over the land in
question.
The principle of first occupation has recently been the subject matter of much
discussion in Australia relating to the rights of aboriginal peoples. The High
Court of Australia in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) was forced to recognize the
communal native title of the Meriam people to land on Murray Island. 29 Such
communitarian property, a form a private property, was vested in the aboriginal
peoples by virtue of tens of thousands years of occupancy. The radical title of
the Crown upon settlement was burdened with this native title and as such these
peoples were not trespassers. First occupation was therefore clearly important in
recognizing such title to the land. In this respect it is important to note that,
although legal systems have modified rules of acquisition through statue, such
legal systems are nevertheless forced to recognize the rights of individuals and
communities who have been in possession of land long before those modified
rules of acquisition.
26 K.Gray and S.F.Gray, "The Idea of Property In Land" Land Law: Themes and
Perspectives, Bright and Dewar (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 1998) at p. 19. In referring to
"words upon parchment" the authors cite Blackstone who could see "no foundation in nature
or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land..."
(Commentaries on the Laws of England, supra n. 13 at ii. 2).
27 The Limitation Act 1980 s. 15(1) lays down a general rule that "[n]o action shall be
brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date
on which the action accrued to him." The effect of this section is to extinguish the title of the
paper owner.
Powell v. McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452, per Slade J. at 470.
29 (1992) 66 A.L.J.R. 408.
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Finally, the occupation theory is regarded by economists to have a special role
to play in the facilitation of trade and the functioning of an effective market.
30
Property plays an integral part in economic affairs, since by the very definition,
economics deals with all things that are both desired and scarce.
Communication and effective occupation has the effect of making it clear who
is the owner of a thing, such clear titles facilitate trade by introducing certainty
in the market place. Every item of property must be owned by somebody, or by
some people in the form of collective property. In the absence of ownership
value cannot exist, unequivocal property claims not only allow efficient
resource utilization but they also allow property to be traded at it highest value.
LABOUR THEORY: PROPERTY A NATURAL RIGHT
Legal and political philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries claimed that the
right of individuals to own and dispose of private property was a natural right of
the individual. John Locke, for example, in his Two Treatises of Government
argued that private property rights existed before the state and independently of
laws prescribed by the state. " Property rights were natural rights of individuals
and thus governed by principles of natural justice, governmental interference or
re-organization of these rights was not permissible without the consent of the
individual.32 Such natural rights were vigorously defended by political
philosophers and indeed formed the basis of revolutionary arguments. In the
French and American Revolutions such natural rights were clearly embedded in
the resulting declarations. Article II of the French Declaration of 1791 holds
that:
"The end of all political associations, is the preservation of the
natural and imprescriptable rights of man; and these rights are
liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression."33
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America
provides:
30 See R.Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston, Little, Brown, 2nd ed., 1977) at pp.21-
31.
31 J.Locke, Two Treatises On Government (1690) Book II; see, "Of Property" in
C.B.Macpherson (ed.) Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (University of Toronto
Press, 1978) at p.17.
32 For a detailed account of Locke's discourse on property see, J.Tully, A Discourse on
Property: John Locke and Adversaries (Cambridge University Press, 1980), and, J.P.Day,
"Locke on Property" 16 Philosophical Quarterly (1966) at pp.207-221.
33 Quoted in ARyan, Property (Open University Press, 1987) at p.61.
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"No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation."34
The idea of natural rights is far from clear. With a history of some two and half
thousand years, what constitutes natural law and natural rights has provoked and
continues to provoke different answers. 35 The traditional line of argument
behind natural law is that there are certain rights which are derived from the law
of God, nature or reason. There are certain moral principles which depend on
the nature of the universe and which are discovered by reason. It is these
principles, such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, which form
natural rights and are protected by natural law. Such laws are not prescribed by
state, they exist before the state and are higher laws which all states and legal
systems therein are subject to. Although it is commonly accepted that natural
law is derived from nature itself and discovered by reason, there have been
different lines of thought as to what is exactly meant by nature and reason. If
such laws are discovered by reason, then whose reasoning prevails? Such a
question is by its very nature subjective, and thus, susceptible to many different
answers. D'Entr~ves has pointed out "many of the ambiguities of the concept of
natural law must be ascribed to the ambiguity of the concept of nature that
underlies this. ' 36 Despite this, Freeman points out that:
"[v]ilews as to the content of these principles have sometimes
diverged but the essence of natural law may be said to lie in the
constant assertion that there objective moral principles which
depend upon the nature of the universe and which can be
discovered by reason. These principles constitute natural law."
37
John Locke argued that the right to private property was one of the natural
rights of an individual and consequently protected by natural law. The right was
natural, not in the sense that every individual was born with the right to
property, rather, the right was acquired through conduct which is natural to
31 S.E.Finer, Five Constitutions (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979) at p. 106.
35 For a good overview of natural law thinking see M-D.A.Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to
Jurisprudence (London, Stevens, 6t" ed., 1994) at p.79 and R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories
(Cambridge University Press, 1979). The most forceful recent statement of natural law is
?rovided by J.Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980).
Natural Law (London, Hutchinson, rev. ed., 1970) at p 16.
M.D.A.Freeman, supra n.35 at p.80.
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man. Private property rights were acquired by natural, moral and rationale
conduct which individuals left to their own devices would perform. As such
private property was acquired separately and did not arise through the
prescriptive law of the state. Locke maintained that it was God and not
sovereign that gave property, and thus, private property existed even before
sovereign and state. The role of government was to protect to the right of
property along with other rights such as the right to life and liberty. Indeed, such
argument was used to refute the claims of Charles I in England that sovereign
could interfere with the property of individuals without their consent for the
public good.
Like Pufendorf3 and Grotius, 39 Locke begins his justification for private
property on the same premise that resources are given to mankind in common,
the original state of property is that it is held in common. The basis of his thesis
thereafter can be summarized in three main points. In the first place, every man
has a right to his own person, we may describe this as self-ownership. 4
Secondly, every man has a right to own his own labour. Finally, every man has
a right to own that which.he has mixed the labour of his own person with.
Mixing one's labour with the common resources which God has given to
mankind extracts that which was held in common into private ownership. This
process taking place as a result of the natural conduct of man and not through
the process of law prescribed by the state.
Locke begins his justification for private property on the same premise as the
occupation theory, that is, the earth and all the resources within it are given to
mankind in general. Locke writes:
"God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of
Life, and convenience. The Earth, and all that is therein.. .belong
to Mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous
hand of Nature; and no body has originally a private Dominion,
exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in any of them, as they are thus
in their nature state...,A4
38 Supra n. 12.
3 Supra n. 11.
40 The use of the word "man" is deliberately used here reflecting the ideological thinking of
the time and the role of man as being far more important in acquiring property rights.
41 Two Treatises of Government (1690) "Second Treatise of Government" Ch. 5. para.26,
reprinted in C.B.Macpherson, supra n.31 at p. 17.
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God gives the earth and the resources within it to man in conmmon, no individual
has an exclusive dominion. In this respect Locke attempts to show that the state
and sovereign have no exclusive rights to resources which allows them to
interfere with and control those resources per se.
In this state of common property, Locke attempts to show that private
property is born out of two natural principles. The first is that, every individual
has by nature property in his own person, sometimes referred to as self-
ownership. Locke writes "every man has Property in his own Person. This no
Body has any Right but to himself"," 2 The Lockean idea of ownership in one's
self has been the subject matter of much debate.43 Waldron writes that "[a] more
promising suggestion is that self ownership and the ownership of actions
amount for Locke to a right to personal liberty.""4 To have ownership in one's
person is to have ownership in his actions, such actions belong to him since he
has a natural right to perform them without any obstruction. The second
principle, and one which flows from the first is that, one of the actions which an
individual will perform is to labowr on resources which have been given in
common. Labour of an individual belongs to the individual alone, consequently,
Locke argues that when such labour is mixed with common resources such
resources are taken from the common and put into the sphere of private
property. Labouring gives the labourer an exclusive private property right to the
resource or thing in question. The object in which labour has been expended
contains something which the labourer owns and as such any taking of the
object or other interference amounts to a violation of the individuals natural
right to the object.
Labour, is thus, the central features of Locke's justification for private
property, however, it does not explain the extent of private property. It is fair to
say that labour on resources will give individuals private control of those
resources, yet there are some unanswered questions. How much private property
can an individual acquire under the Lockean theory? How much labour need
one expend before he or she becomes entitled to the thing and does labour have
to reflect the value added to the resource in question? Locke addresses the first
question raised here in his theory, the latter is not discussed and as such has
been the more critical aspect of his theory. Although labour gives birth to a
private property right, Locke does impose restrictions on the amount of such
42 Ibid para. 27 at p 18.
43 See, for example, J.Tully, supra n.32 at p105 who argues that the term "person" is a
technical term quite distinct from "body." Tully argues that such use of the word person more
accurately describes personal identity, thus, an individual has ownership in his personal
identity. For a critical account of ownership in one's self, see; J.P.Day, supra n.32.
14 Waldron, supra n. I at p. 181.
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property. In his writings one identifies two limitations on the labour principle,
namely; the "spoilation proviso" and the "sufficiency limitation."
First, although labour will give private property, if the labourer does not use
resources, then despite his labour, those resources do not belong to him but
become common again. He writes:
"God has given us all things richly... But how far has he given it
us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any
advantage in life before it spoils; so much may be by his labour
fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share,
and belongs to others."
45
This has often been referred to as the "spoilation proviso, ' 6 and has been
described by Waldron as:
"a generous one, because Locke's concept of use is very broad.
It is to any advantage of life and therefore is not confined to
consumption or production for consumption, but also includes,
for example, aesthetic uses and the use of objects as a
commodity in exchange.""7
Although Locke provides for this spoilation limitation, he does not see that
there would by any problems of excessive concentration of private property into
certain hands at the expense of others. This is simply because in his thesis he
regards right and convenience to go hand in hand. Thus, any labour which is
mixed with more than that is needed for one's convenience simply goes back
into the common. Locke noted that:
"there could be no reason for quarreling about Title, nor about
the largeness of Possession it gave. Right and conveniency went
together; for as a Man had a right to all he could employ his
Labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he
could make use of." 8
45 J.Locke, "Second Treatise on Government" para.3 1, in C.B.Macpherson, supra n.3 1 at
9.
See, J.H.Bogart, "Lockean Provisos and State of Nature Theories"95 Ethics (1985).
47 Waldron, supra n. I at p.207.
48 J.Locke, "Second Treatise on Government" para.51, in C.B.Macpherson supra n.31 at
p27.
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This proviso works well enough in a social and economic climate where right
and need go together, however, as Dunn has pointed out, the role of exchange
and money did put a rather different emphasis on the matter.49 Dunn writes that
the introduction of money meant that:
"right and conveniency no longer went together. The entire
social and economic order of the seventeenth-century England
rested upon a human institution about whose moral status Locke
felt deeply ambivalent."5
The second limitation on property in Locke's theory is that, an individual who
does labour, must leave behind enough resources of the same quality for others
to appropriate. This is necessary because the function of property in Locke's
theory is the satisfaction of need. Without such property individuals cannot
exist, human needs dictate that there should be private property. This limitation
has been described as the "sufficiency limitation,",51 it seeks to make
appropriation illegitimate when there is insufficient left for the needs of others.
Locke writes:
"[flor this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is one
joyned to, at least where there is enough and as good left in
common for others. 5 2
At first instance, this limitation of the right to appropriate seems rather
paradoxical, for example, Thomson writes:
"if the first labour-mixer must literally leave as much and as
good for others who come along later, then no one can come to
49 J.Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge University Press, 1969) at p.40.50 bid Writers like Dunn have sought to argue that the introduction of money was somewhat
at odds with Locke's theory. Waldron, supra n. 1 at p209, however, argues that in respect of
the Locke's spoilation proviso, it is not rendered ineffective by new conditions in economy.
This is simply because the amount of appropriation is determined by labour and not the
proviso. Providing there is labour and some element of use and consumption, use having a
very wide meaning, the labourer is entitled to everything which does not perish.
5' C.B.Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962) at p.211.
2 J.Locke, "Second Treatise on Government" para.27, in C.B.Macpherson supra n.31 at
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own anything, for there are finitely many things in the world so
that everyone taking leaves less for others.
53
The Lockean justification for private property works well under conditions of
plenty, since under conditions of plenty and lack of scarcity this sufficiency
limitation will never be violated. The social and economic conditions operating
at the time of Locke's writing may well have made it impossible for
appropriation to become illegitimate by virtue of the sufficiency limitation. The
reason for this is that Locke associates private property rights with convenience,
such convenience being the satisfaction of human needs and subsistence.
Anything beyond this would be improper, for example, the idea of property and
convenience going together is illustrated when he states that there would be
enough land in the world for twice its population:
"had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of
Men to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger
Possessions, and a Right to them..."
54
The sufficiency limitation works well under conditions of plenty, but under
conditions of scarcity all appropriation becomes illegitimate for the reason
stated above. Does the Lockean justification for private property, therefore,
become redundant? This is a question which has provoked different responses.
One response is that in an age of scarcity, unilateral appropriation becomes no
longer possible and property must be distributed in different way, for example
through consent. Perhaps the most effective interpretation of the sufficiency
limitation is that provided by Waldron. 55 Waldron explains that the sufficiency
limitation is not really a limitation in its own right but, rather, an effect of the
spoilation proviso discussed above. He gives the example of an individual living
under conditions of modest scarcity, such individual needs to appropriate
resources for his needs but he realizes that his appropriation will leave less for
others who have a similar need to appropriate. If the sufficiency limitation is
taken to its logical conclusion, does he sit back and starve? Indeed, to
appropriate under such conditions he would be violating natural law. In the
context of this example, Waldron explains that such a conclusion would be
53 J.J.Thomson, The Realm of Rights (London, Harvard University Press, 1990) at p.330.
Thomson is not alone in making this point, J.H.Bogart writes: "[e]very acquisition worsens
the lot of others- and worsens their lot in relevant ways" supra n.46 at p.834.
54 J.Locke, "Second Treatise on Government" para.36. in C.B.Macpherson supra n.31 at
.21.
Supra n. Il at pp.211-213.
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absurd and inconsistent with the substance of Locke's theory of property. It
would in effect mean that because every one else in the world is in a similar
position everyone has to starve.
Waldron writes:
"all God's human creatures would perish notwithstanding the
fact that He had provided resources for the sustenance of at least
some of them. Such a result, dictated by the alleged proviso in
conditions of scarcity, is absurd... It follows, surely, that he who
appropriated the food and shelter he really needs is entitled, even
bound to use them-irrespective of the needs of others."56
The only limitation being that if he appropriates more than his needs then others
have a right to be sustained out of his surplus.
Schmidtz provides a somewhat different response to the sufficiency
limitation.5 7 Schmitdz explains that appropriation is not what he calls a "zero
sum game.,, 58 It is not plausible for philosophers on original acquisition, and for
that matter subsequent readers of the theories provided by such philosophers, to
maintain that all appropriation takes place by the first person to arrive. First
appropriation is just the beginnings of creating the resource in question, the real
benefits to be enjoyed by later owners. Schmitdz neatly explains the point when
he writes:
"[o]riginal appropriation diminishes the stock of what can be
originally appropriated, but that is not the same thing as
diminishing the stock of what can be owned. On the contrary, in
taking control of resources and thereby reducing the stock of
what can be appropriated, people typically generate massive
increases in the stock of what can be owned. The lesson is that
appropriation is not a zero-sum game. It is a positive sum game.
As Locke himself stressed, it creates the possibility of mutual
benefit on a massive scale." 9
The question was raised above regarding the extent of labour needed before I
can regard the thing in question as mine. This is different from the question
56 lbid at p.214.
57 D. Schmitdz, "The Institution of Property" in Property Rights, Frankel, Miller and Paul
feds.) (Cambridge University Press, 1994) at p.42.
8 Ibid at p.45.
'9 Ibid at p.46.
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discussed so far, that is, how much private property I can acquire under Locke's
theory? Whilst the amount of private property which can be acquired or
appropriated is governed by the spoliation proviso and the sufficiency
limitation, a question which is not directly tackled by Locke is the relationship
of labour to the value added to the thing in question. It is this aspect of his
theory which has been the subject matter of criticism. Nozick makes the point
that, even if labour can be owned and such labour is mixed with resources, does
it automatically mean that the resources becomes the private property of the
labourer? 60 For example, if I make the very first effort to extract the oil from the
bottom of the seabed, am I entitled to the world's supply of oil? Nozick's
primary concern relates to the fact that where labour is expended by the
labourer, why should the labourer be entitled to an exclusive right over the
resource in question? His right should only extend in so far as to the added
value to the resource in question. The potential problem with this line of attack
by Nozick is that how does one practically discriminate between lesser and
greater interests in resources in a simple state of nature. Waldron -makes the
point that only in a positive legal system can different estates and interests in the
same object be recognized, distinguished and upheld in law. 6' The plausible
explanation here is that in a state of nature full and exclusive entitlements are
only provisional and in any event:
"could not operate as moral constraints on the activity of a
subsequently instituted civil society which was determined to
strike retrospectively and in rectification of the crudeness of the
natural entitlements on a fair balance between the legitimate
claims of the appropriator and those of the rest of mankind., 62
A second criticism directed at Locke's theory is why should the mixing of
labour with a resource give any entitlement at all? The much quoted question
which Nozick asks is:
"[w]hy isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of
losing what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't
have. If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it into the sea so
that its molecules... mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I
60 R.Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974) at p. 175.
61 Supran. 1 at p.191.
62 Ibid
THEORIES OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my
tomato juice?' 63
This question posed by Nozick is often taken to illustrate the shortcomings of
the labour principle in Locke's theory, however, as one commentator explains
1 1 .~64 Dxuyg
such criticism is inappropriate. Duxbury gives two reasons; in the first place,
Locke only recognizes those activities which improve the resource as
constitutive of labour. Secondly, a person who does labour and makes no
improvement to the resource in question or even diminishes its value, is simply
acting irrationally or out of ignorance,
How far is the natural right justification for private property relevant in
modem property law? Critics of the natural law theory of private property reject
it has having any significance in modem property law. In the first place, there
appears to be the theological dimensions to the theory and the resulting question
as to how, and the extent to which, the Church continues to influence the legal
policy making process. Legal philosophers argue that private property must be
justified by some greater social and economic objective rather than by reference
to historical entitlement. Like the occupation theory the view is that such a
theory only explains the principle of original acquisition. The matter is perhaps
no better surmned up than by Simmons who writes:
"[t]here is a solid consensus among philosophers and legal and
political theorists that attempted original acquisition
justifications of private property, when presented in any even
remotely plausible form, in fact have little or no interesting
justificatory force. However compelling their intuitive
underpinnings might be, they can justify nothing which helps
much in our deliberation about the possible moral defenses of
private property in contemporary society. 65
Simmons, however, challenges this consensus by examining the idea of
justification of private property. His main aim is to show that when
philosophers talk of justifying private property, the concept itself is very vague.
Justifications of private property can be one of two types, namely, "optimality
justifications" or "permissibility justifications. 66 The former justification looks
63 Supra n.60 at pp.174-75.
64 N.Duxbury, Theorising Private Property Rights (University of Manchester Working Paper
No. 20 1996) at p. 11.
65 A.J.Simmons, supra n. 10 at p.65.
66 Ibidat p.66.
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to the wider social, moral and economic goals of having one type of property
over another. Thus, an optimal justification of private property would sound
something like this: it is better to have private ownership because it provides for
the greater human happiness in society or it is the best means of efficient
utilization of resources. On the other hand, permissibility justifications simply
look to what was morally permissible or morally legitimate. The everyday
actions of an individual are not always done with the individual seeking to do
what was optimal in the sense of the best alternative. Individuals do not
necessarily do what was the best thing they could have done in the
circumstances, rather, they do things because they think they are morally
permissible or otherwise legitimate without any wider objective goal in mind. In
this context, Simmons writes:
"the primary force of Locke's original justification of private
property is to display private property rights as morally possible
and permissible... The permissibility arguments constitute an
attempted justification of private property, they show that private
property claims can be legitimate (i.e. morally acceptable),
probably were once mostly legitimate and may still be legitimate
in certain contexts., 67
Finally, the principles emerging from the labour theory continue to be
reflected in intellectual property rights and in the law and policy concerning
unfair competition.68 Individuals who create, manufacture or invent things
through their labour and intelligence seek to make these things theirs through
their acts of labour. It has been said that the law of intellectual property, "is a
branch of law which protects some of the finest manifestations of human
achievement."
69
UTILITARIAN THEORY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: PROPERTY A
POSITIVE RIGHT
The utilitarian theory of property regards property as a positive right created
instrumentally by law to achieve wider social and economic objectives.
Property is said to be a positive right as opposed to a natural right. The essence
67 Ibid at p.73.
68 See, for example, R.G.Hammond, Personal Property Law (Oxford University Press, 1992)
at p.51.
69 W.R.Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks, and Allied Rights
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed., 1989) at p. 3 .
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of a positive right is that it is prescribed by state, the right is both given and
protected by state. The most influential utilitarian justification for private
property is that of Jeremy Bentham contained in his Principles of the Civil
Code.70 The principal thrust of Bentham's argument is that the total or average
happiness of society cannot be maximized unless there exists rights to
appropriate, use and transfer objects of value or interest. In order to understand
the utilitarian justification for private property it is necessary to understand
exactly what is meant by the concepts of utilitarianism and positive law.
Jeremy Bentham rejected that there could be any notion of natural law and
natural rights. In his words, "[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and
imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense, -nonsense upon stilts."'7' Bentham
argued that all laws flowed form the state alone, states prescribed laws and such
laws were positive laws. The principle upon which a law would be prescribed
was the principle of utility. The concept of utility and utilitarianism is explained
by one commentator in the following manner:
"[t]he classical utilitarian theories (of Bentham, J.S.Mill...) took
the fundamental basis of morality to be a requirement that
happiness should be maximized: the basic principle of utility
required us to weigh up the consequences, in terms of happiness
and unhappiness of various alternative actions, and choose that
action which would, on balance, have the best consequences, in
the sense of producing the largest net balance of happiness. 72
The principle of utility alone governs what we should or should not do, in other
words, the principle is used by state and sovereign and its law-making
authorities to command rules. Law and rights are not dependent on moral
judgments and our actions cannot be simply justified on past facts.
In rejecting property as a natural or moral right of an individual, Bentham
claimed that private property and law are born and die together. Without laws
70 (1830), see his analysis of property in C.B.Macpherson, supra n.31 at pp.41-59. The best
edition is that contained in Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, C.K.Ogden (ed.)
tLondon, Routledge, 1931).
' JBentham, "Anarchical Fallacies" in Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke, andMarx,
on the Rights of Man, J.Waldron (ed), (London, Methuen, 1987) at p.53.
72 N.E. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights (Sweet &
Maxwell, 1986), at p. 15, There is no scope in this article for a complete analysis of
utilitarianism, however, for further analysis, see ; J.J.C Smart and B.Williams, Utilitarianism:
For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973); D.Lyons, Forms and Limits of
Utilitarianism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965); Sen and Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and
Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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there is no private property, thus, even where a person is to labour on a
resource, his only entitlement to the resource is the guarantee that the law will
assure the enjoyment of his labour. In this sense laws perform the function of
security, without which there would be misery and a denial of the right to
subsist. The positivist nature of the right to private property is clear when
Bentham writes:
"[t]he idea of property consists in an established expectation; in
the persuasion of being able to draw such or such an advantage
from the thing possessed, according to the nature of the case.
Now this expectation, this persuasion, can only be the work of
the law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I
regard as mine, except through the promise of the law which
guarantees it to me. 3
Bentham argues that that the greatest or total happiness in society in respect of
resources will only come about if such resources are in the hands of private
individuals, how does he apply the utility principle to private property? The
assumption is that acquisition of wealth is good, but good in what manner? In
respect of the utility principle Duxbury writes:
"the principle is inherently vague in that it is not entirely clear
how it is supposed to be applied or how utility might be
measured or - assuming satisfactory criteria for measurement are
devised - how the utilitarian is expected to balance one-person's
gain in utility against a loss in that of another."
74
Bentham does not provide a precise way in which hunan happiness can be
measured, instead, in his work Bentham identifies what he calls "evils"
resulting from violations of private property.
The first evil which Bentham comments upon in Principles of the Civil Code
is the evil of non-possession. The acquisition of a resource is a good thing, non-
possession on the other hand an evil since the resource is simply being wasted.
Secondly, there is the pain of losing since, where I do have private property and
possession of things, such property performs different functions and represents
to the individual different values. Property may have an intrinsic value but it
also has a value of affection, for example, as an inheritance, as the reward of
labour, of the provision for dependents. Thirdly, there is the fear of losing what
73 J.Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code (1830) in C.B.Macpherson supra n.31 at p.52.
74 N.Duxbury, supra n.64 at p.4.
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one already has. Whilst individuals have property, future acquisitions are
necessary to supplement the ones which an individual already possesses. If the
law does not guarantee private property then there is a fear of losing what we
already have, this is a bad thing, since resources are not utilized properly.
Instead they are hidden or preserved and the enjoyment of them becomes
"sombre, furtive, and solitary., 75 Finally, there is what Bentham describes as the
deadening of industry which arises form the insecurity of labour and the
resulting fruits of labour. Bentham argues that it is the law alone can give
security in respect of these four evils.
One of the shortcomings of Bentham' s utilitarian justification for private
property is that it does not address the question of how people become to own
resources and how initial distribution arises in the first place. Bentham's
philosophy of property and law was written in a period witnessing the end of the
medieval period and the beginnings of a capitalist economy. Certainly his ideas
were influenced by the industrial revolution and the rise of nation states anxious
to assert total independence in this age of economic expansion. It may be that
Bentham had no need to worry about how initial acquisitions of property
occurred, instead justifying private property in this age of economic expansion.
Land had become more and more parceled into private ownership and rights in
land more absolute. 76 In so far as the question of initial distribution of wealth
and resources, it is commonly said that the utilitarian is not concerned with this
question since his primary aim is the maximization of welfare. Presumably this
means that that those who have the largest amount of property will have the
greatest opportunity to maximize wealth. What about those who have nothing or
very little? Is the utilitarian concerned about the distribution of welfare or is the
divide between poor and rich not a concern for a utilitarian?
It is submitted that the distribution of welfare is a central concern for the
utilitarian and thus an integral part of any utilitarian justification for private
property. Distribution of welfare can take place on the theory of diminishing
marginal utility which itself needs to be balanced with the objectives of
maximization of welfare. Simmonds77 explains the theory of marginal utility
with the following example; an extra £1 given to a millionaire will make an
negligible contribution to his welfare, whereas £1 given to a very poor person
might make a significant contribution to his welfare, enabling him, perhaps, to
buy a meal which he would not have been able to afford. The £1 in the hands of
75 J.Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code (1830) in C.B. Macpherson supra n.31 at p.54.
76 See, for example, C.B.Macpherson, "Capitalism and the Changing Nature of Property" in
E. Kamenka and R.S.Neale (eds.) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (London, Edwards
Arnord, 1975) at p. 105.
77 Supra n.72 at p.32.
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the poor man has the effect of maximizing welfare on a much greater scale than
in the hands of a rich man. However, marginal utility needs to be balanced with
the fact that high productivity requires resources to be placed in the hands of
individuals who have strong incentives to work hard. Strict equality of resources
will inevitable bring about a reduction in the productivity and welfare in the
long run. In this respect, Simnonds explains that a utilitarian can offer a
plausible response to distributive issues, he identifies two main arguments
which purport to show the distributive nature of utilitarian arguments. He
writes:
"[f]irst the utilitarian can claim that his theory explains the way
in which we do in fact trade off equality against productive and
economic efficiency. This trade off is neither arbitrary nor
hypothetical: it reflects the fact that the underlying concern is the
maximization of welfare, that being a goal to which both
redistribution and higher productivity can contribute. Secondly,
the utilitarian can argue that he alone has offered a plausible
explanation of why redistribution matters. When we take money
from the rich and give to the poor, he may argue, we do this
because we believe it will do more good relieving poverty than
being spent on trivial comforts."
78
Seen in this way, like the Lockean natural right justification for private
property, there are limitations on the extent of private property under a
utilitarian justification. Under Locke's theory we identified the spoliation and
sufficiency limitations, the utilitarian principle of maximization of welfare does
accommodate the need for distribution to others.
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY
In more recent times philosophers have advanced economic justifications for
private property. This has been part and parcel of a process whereby laws have
been analyzed from a purely economic perspective which, in substance,
represents a scientific alternative to utilitarianism as discussed above. 79 Property
underlies each and every aspect of economics, since by its very definition,
" Ibid at p.33.
79 The economic analysis of law has generated a vast literature, see R.Posner, supra n.30.
A.M.Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Boston, Little, Brown, 1989); and in
the context of property rights, see, B. Ackerman, The Economic Foundations of Property Law
(Boston, Little, Brown, 1975).
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economics deals with all things of worth. Posner argues that the legal protection
of property rights performs a very important economic function, that is, to
create incentives to use resources much more efficiently.8° Posner identifies
three criteria for an efficient system of property rights. First, "universality" that
is all resources should be owned by someone or capable of being owned except
those resources which are so abundant that consumption does not reduce the
resource for others. Secondly, "exclusivity," that is, to give owners the incentive
to incur the cost required to make efficient use of resources which they own.
Finally, "transferability," property rights should be able to be freely transferred
since this is the only way that a resource can be shifted from a less productive
use to a more productive one. In substance, this economic justification for
private property argues that there are costs or disutilities when there is no
ownership of resources. If these costs are much greater than the costs involved
in having a private property regime, then a system of private property rights is
justified by considerations of economic efficiency. The essence of the economic
justification for private property is the minimizing of cost and the resulting
efficiency in distribution of resources."
Like Posner, Demsetz argues that the general welfare will be better served if
material resources are owned and controlled by private individuals. 82 A system
of private ownership is much better than any other, such a communal, because
individuals will not feel the full impact of the benefits of his use and also the
costs of his use. According to Demsetz, the "primary function of property rights
is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities." 83 He gives the example of a communal ownership of land by a
80 lbidat pp.10-13.
81 The economic idea of efficiency is construed in one of two ways Pareto efficiency and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, A situation is said to be Pareto optimal if it is impossible to change
it without making at least one person believe he is worse of than before the change. Thus,
under this principle an allocation of resources will be Pareto optimal, if any other different
system of allocation makes one person better off but only to the cost of another. A situation
may be Pareto superior if a change produces a gain in one person but not at the expense of
anyone else, in other words, one person is better of and no one else is affected in terms of
loss. The difficulty with the Pareto standard applies when there are no losers, however, most
rules and social policies produce both winners and losers. The Kaldor-Hicks test gets round
this problem by allowing a situation to be optimal or efficient if someone is made better off
by a change but losers are fully compensated for their loss. Thus, an allocation of resources
will be efficient where those who lose as result of the allocation are fully compensated. See
J.L.Coleman, "The Economic Analysis of Law" in J.R.Penncock and J.W.Chapman (eds.)
Nomos XXIV. Ethics, Economics, and the Law (New York University Press, 1982) at pp.83-
103.
82 H.Demsetz, supra n.5.
83 Ibid at p.348.
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
group of hunters. When these group of hunters hunt on the land, no individual
hunter has any incentive to increase or maintain the stock of game. This is
simply because the cost of doing so will go to others as well as himself. The
consequence is that there will be over intensive hunting and a reduction in the
game stock which will not only affect his fellow hunters but hunters for
generations to come. It is because the cost of one's use is not reflected in
communal ownership that a private property regime is justified. A private
scheme of ownership over game territory is much better because it:
"will internalize many of the external costs associated with
communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of his power
to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards
associated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility
of his land. The concentration of benefits and costs on owners
creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.
'
"
8 4
CONCLUSIONS
It is often thought that theorising private property is a task for political and
economic philosophers rather than for property lawyers. The assumption
appears to be that, how private property regimes come about and the possible
justifications thereof, are questions of political and economic theory. As a result
of this, an equally important assumption appears to be that political and
economic theory can be divorced from any legal discourse on the system of
property rules. The role of the property lawyers is to consult legal materials and
advise his client on property transactions. Yet, as this article has shown, these
assumptions need serious challenge. Understanding the theoretical underpinning
of property rights is important for a property lawyer. The perspectives offered
by the various justificatory theories of private property continue to be reflected
in the case law, they also influence policy makers and legislators. Moreover, the
theoretical analysis of private property serves to help the understand
contemporary problems in property law by attempting to explain how such
doctrinal problems have arisen and what factors have caused them.
"' Ibid at p.356.
